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Beyond Religious Freedom: The New Global Politics of Religion, by
Elizabeth Shakman Hurd
Abstract

The international media is saturated with stories of religious violence and persecution—particularly in the
Middle East. The United States has been engaged in an ongoing battle to combat this violence around the
globe, often in the name of ‘religious freedom.’ The concept of religious freedom is typically portrayed as an
unalloyed good—an aspiration and ideal that the international community should strive towards. Following
the passing of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, the United States established an Office of
International Religious Freedom. Canada established a similar version with its own Office of Religious
Freedom in 2013. In her provocative book, Beyond Religious Freedom: The New Global Politics of Religion,
Elizabeth Shakman Hurd critically examines the pursuit of religious freedom as an intrinsic good. Contrary to
the prevailing narrative, Shakman Hurd provides a critique of government-led programs and policies that
promote religious freedom abroad. She illustrates some of the deeply problematic consequences that occur
when religious freedom is used as a tool of foreign policy, and when complex issues are defined solely in terms
of religious rights and freedoms.
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Book Review

Beyond Religious Freedom: The New
Global Politics of Religion, by Elizabeth
Shakman Hurd1
RACHEL DEVON2
THE INTERNATIONAL MEDIA IS SATURATED with stories of religious violence and

persecution—particularly in the Middle East. The United States has been engaged
in an ongoing battle to combat this violence around the globe, often in the name
of ‘religious freedom.’ The concept of religious freedom is typically portrayed as
an unalloyed good—an aspiration and ideal that the international community
should strive towards. Following the passing of the International Religious
Freedom Act of 1998, the United States established an Office of International
Religious Freedom.3 Canada established a similar version with its own Office of
Religious Freedom in 2013.4 In her provocative book, Beyond Religious Freedom:
The New Global Politics of Religion, Elizabeth Shakman Hurd critically examines
the pursuit of religious freedom as an intrinsic good. Contrary to the prevailing
narrative, Shakman Hurd provides a critique of government-led programs and
policies that promote religious freedom abroad. She illustrates some of the deeply
1.
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problematic consequences that occur when religious freedom is used as a tool of
foreign policy, and when complex issues are defined solely in terms of religious
rights and freedoms.
Shakman Hurd begins on a cautionary note. She argues against attempts to
posit religion as a stable category driving the creation of foreign policy, the pursuit
of rights advocacy, and international governance. She suggests that “[t]o rely
uncritically on ‘religion’ as an object of law and policy, whether domestically
or internationally, exacerbates the very problems that many modern attempts
to govern deliberatively and democratically have sought to manage or resolve.”5
In making this argument, she distinguishes between expert religion, official
religion, and lived religion. She describes expert religion as religion defined
by those who generate policy-relevant knowledge, such as scholars and policy
experts.6 In contrast to expert religion, lived religion is religion as practiced by
ordinary people; this category captures practices that “fall outside the confines of
religion as construed for purposes of law and governance.”7 Finally, she describes
official religion (or governing religion) as religion defined for the purposes of law
and government—religion that is privileged through advocacy for international
religious freedom.8 In this sense, official religion necessitates clear policy choices
about what does or does not count as religion.
After setting up this conceptual framework for analysis in chapter one,
Shakman Hurd then invokes case studies of so-called religious minorities around
the globe to illustrate prevailing narratives about the pursuit of religious freedom.
It is the seamless integration of theory with real-world case studies that makes
Shakman Hurd’s book so effective. While each chapter includes a theoretical or
philosophical argument regarding the problems inherent in relying on religion
as a stable category of foreign policy, the case studies bring her arguments to
life, making them easy to understand. She discusses the Sahrawi refugees fleeing
Moroccan forces, the Rohingya in Myanmar, and the Alevis in Turkey, as just a
few examples. Drawing on case studies from these lesser-known groups makes
Shakman Hurd’s work particularly engaging.
Shakman Hurd describes a discourse she calls the “two faces of faith” which
she argues “shapes the contemporary global governance of religious diversity.”9
She suggests that experts typically speak of religion as having “two faces”—meaning
5.
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religion appears both as a problem and as its own solution. On the one hand, there
is “bad religion”: religion that requires discipline and surveillance.10 On the other
hand, there is “good religion”: religion that promotes an international public
good, such as through humanitarian relief efforts.11 Shakman Hurd invokes the
example of the Sahrawi refugees fleeing Moroccan forces to explain how this
discourse manifests in practice.
Shakman Hurd ultimately suggests that governing social difference through
religious rights and freedom serves to reduce “complex social, historical, and
political histories and inequalities to a problem of religion,” while deflecting
tension away from other sources of exclusion such as class, colonial history,
economic justice, and land rights.12 In making this argument, she invokes the
example of the Rohingya people, typically labelled by international commentators
as a “persecuted Muslim minority.”13 She argues that the marginalization of
the Rohingya cannot be reduced to religion; that to classify the Rohingya as a
persecuted religious minority is to single out religious identity from a number
of other discriminatory forces at play.14 Singling out religious difference as the
sole motivator of the violence “misrepresents the complexity of the situation
and deflects attention away from the Rohingya’s comprehensive exclusion from
Burmese state and society historically and in the present.”15 Drawing on the
example of the K’iche’—a Maya ethnic group living in Guatemala16—Shakman
Hurd further argues that the logic of religious rights renders politically invisible
less established religions and other modes of belonging that do not count as
‘religious.’17 Finally, she takes issue with the fact that contemporary religious
freedom advocacy emphasizes belief as the core of religion, because this reflects a
particular understanding of religion that is not universal.18 The basic argument
of this chapter of the book is that “[g]overning difference through religious
rights and freedoms authorizes particular understandings of what it means to be
religious, and what it means for religion to be free.”19
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She then explores and critiques the politics of US foreign religious
engagement projects—religious reform projects that instruct individuals and
groups abroad how to ‘be free.’ She describes how American foreign relations have
been characterized by attempts to cultivate forms of religiosity in other countries,
although tellingly only those aligning with American strategic interests.20
This is problematic, according to Shakman Hurd, because it puts the onus on
government to define who is religious and who is not, what counts as religious
authority, and which religions are legitimate enough for engagement.21 Further,
she is concerned by such government-sponsored religious outreach and suggests
that “[t]he religions of the majority, the politically powerful, or those sympathetic
to US political and strategic interests” are the ones that attract support.22 While
this paints a somewhat bleak account of foreign religious freedom projects led by
the United States, it also portrays a powerful and important counter-narrative to
the notion of religious engagement as purely altruistic.
In chapter five, Shakman Hurd explores the implications of labelling certain
groups as religious minorities in need of legal protection. In the case of the Alevis,
she argues that such an approach “obscures a broader field of lived cultural and
religious practices and traditions that are associated with Alevism, downplays
the cross-cutting ties and affiliations between Alevi and non-Alevi communities,
and reinforces the exclusionary connection forged by the Turkish state between
governed Sunni Islam and Turkish nationalism.”23
Her arguments are summarized in the final chapter. Overall, the resounding
message from the book is that religion is not a stable category from which to
create foreign policy and to govern internationally. She contends that such an
approach risks “exacerbating the social tensions, forms of discrimination, and
inter-communal discord that [it] claim[s] to be uniquely equipped to transcend.”24
Shakman Hurd’s overall argument is compelling. However, her critique of
the pursuit of religious freedom as an intrinsic good can be, at times, both overly
simplistic and harsh. First, while it is true that religions are not homogenous, this
does not mean that religion is never a category of exclusion or that persecution
does not occur on religious grounds. While defining persecution in religious
terms may obscure other forms of discrimination, certain groups may not have
any other means of claiming rights protection other than on the grounds of
20.
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religion. Perhaps then, Shakman Hurd may be too harsh in suggesting that the
global pursuit of religious freedom is fundamentally misguided. Second, her
critique of using the category of religion as a basis from which to conduct foreign
policy, because of its inherent internal divisions and dissent, is overly simplistic.
Applying that same line of argument, other categories of belonging such as
geography, ethnicity, and race appear equally complicated and ill suited as a basis
for the creation of foreign policy. Despite diversity within religions, religion is
often the primary category in which groups understand and define themselves.
If that is the case, why should religion not be viewed as an appropriate category of
political analysis and foreign relations? In this respect, Shakman Hurd’s analysis
provokes the reader to think critically about what categories of belonging, if any,
can be used to categorize, motivate, and drive foreign policy.
Overall, Shakman Hurd’s book is engaging and well argued. As a critical and
thought-provoking piece, Beyond Religious Freedom leaves the reader questioning
the prevailing narrative of the pursuit of religious freedom as an intrinsic good.
This book is particularly timely for Canadian readers given that in 2016, Canada’s
Office of Religious Freedom was replaced with an office focused more broadly
on human rights. Stéphane Dion, Canada’s former Minister of Foreign Affairs,
stated that “it was a ‘mistake’ to ‘isolate’ freedom of religion from Canada’s
broader human rights efforts,” since “inclusion includes freedom of religion with
other aspects of our society. Pluralism. Rights of women. Rights of refugees.”25
This broadening of focus seems to reflect Shakman Hurd’s underlying concern
regarding the instability of religion as the basis of legal protection. It demonstrates,
as Shakman Hurd makes so powerfully clear, that religion is deeply embedded in
politics and history—rather than standing apart from it.
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